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Summary 
This article describes the results of a major study on the impact of codes of conduct and international 
framework agreements (IFAs) on social regulation at company level. The limits of labour legislation at 
the national, as well as the international, level provide a strong motivation for both multinationals 
and trade unions to negotiate and sign IFAs. IFAs offer a way to regulate the social consequences of 
globalisation and to secure adherence to labour and social standards. They thus form part of the 
growing political debate on the international working and production standards of private actors. 
Examination of the negotiation process, the motivations of the parties, and the content of the 
agreements and implementation measures provides valuable insights into the impact of IFAs on 
multinationals’ behaviour in respect of social dialogue and core labour standards. Finally, the article 
highlights the influence of such agreements on public policy-making and the limits of private self-
regulation at European and international level, addressing the growing and controversial debate on 
the need for supranational structures to regulate labour standards and industrial relations. 
 
Résumé 
Cet article décrit les résultats d’une étude majeure sur l’impact des codes de conduite et des accords 
cadres internationaux (ACI) sur la réglementation sociale au niveau de l’entreprise. Les limites de la 
législation du travail aux niveaux tant national qu’international motivent fortement et les 
multinationales et les syndicats à négocier et à signer des ACI. Les ACI offrent un moyen de réguler 
les conséquences sociales de la globalisation et de garantir une adhésion aux normes sociales et aux 
normes du travail. Ils font donc partie du débat politique croissant sur les normes du travail et de 
production internationales des acteurs privés. L’examen du processus de négociation, des 
motivations des parties, du contenu des accords et des mesures de mise en oeuvre permet de se 
forger une idée claire et utile de l’impact des ACI sur le comportement des multinationales en 
matière de respect du dialogue social et des normes du travail fondamentales. Enfin, l’article met en 
évidence l’influence de tels accords sur les politiques adoptées par les autorités publiques et les 
limites de l’autorégulation privée aux niveaux européen et international, en abordant le débat 
croissant et controversé sur le besoin de structures supranationales pour réguler les normes du 
travail et les relations professionnelles. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Dieser Beitrag beschreibt die Ergebnisse einer groß angelegten Studie über die Auswirkungen von 
Verhaltenskodizes und internationalen Rahmenvereinbarungen (IFA) auf die soziale Regelung auf 
Unternehmensebene. Angesichts der Grenzen der arbeitsrechtlichen Vorschriften auf 
einzelstaatlicher und internationaler Ebene ist es für multinationale Unternehmen und 
Gewerkschaften wichtig, IFA zu verhandeln und zu unterzeichnen. Diese Vereinbarungen bieten die 
                                                          
1 This article summarises the results of a research project ‘Codes of conduct and international framework agreements: new developments 
in social regulation at company level’ for the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. The final report 
is due to be published in early 2008. 
The project was carried out jointly by a consortium of Wilke, Maack and Partner in Hamburg, Audencia Nantes School of Management and 
the ETUI-REHS in Brussels. 
Möglichkeit, die sozialen Folgen der Globalisierung zu regeln und zu gewährleisten, dass Arbeits- und 
Sozialnormen erfüllt werden. Folglich sind sie auch Teil der zunehmenden politischen Debatte über 
die internationalen Arbeits- und Produktionsnormen privater Akteure. Die Untersuchung des 
Verhandlungsprozesses, der Beweggründe der beteiligten Parteien und des Inhalts der 
Vereinbarungen sowie der Durchführungsmaßnahmen liefert wertvolle Einblicke in die Auswirkungen 
der IFA auf das Verhalten der multinationalen Unternehmen in Bezug auf den sozialen Dialog und 
Kernarbeitsnormen. Zum Schluss wird der Einfluss derartiger Vereinbarungen auf die öffentliche 
Politikgestaltung beschrieben und auf die Grenzen der Selbstregulierung privatwirtschaftlicher 
Unternehmen auf europäischer und internationaler Ebene hingewiesen. In diesem Zusammenhang 
entwickelt sich eine kontroverse Debatte über die Frage, ob es supranationaler Strukturen für die 
Regelung von Arbeitsnormen und industriellen Beziehungen bedarf. 
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Over the past few decades, the fast process of globalisation has been accompanied by a growing 
political debate on international working and production standards. As the liberalisation of trade and 
capital movements starts to challenge established national forms of social dialogue and industrial 
regulation, there is a growing controversy within the debate on the need for supranational structures 
and regulation of labour standards and industrial relations. 
 
In response to concerns raised by trade unions, NGO campaigns and consumer protests, as well as 
the initiatives of several international organisations such as the OECD2, the ILO3 or the UN4, many 
multinationals have accordingly paid more attention to their corporate social responsibility (CSR); 
this is defined by the European Commission as the voluntary integration of social and environmental 
concerns in a company’s business operations and its interaction with its stakeholders (European 
Commission 2002). In doing so, companies should go beyond legal minimum requirements and 
obligations stemming from collective agreements in order to address societal needs. This latter 
aspect of CSR is much criticised, as codes of conduct tend to prevent or at least to delay the adoption 
of new legally binding social regulations. Furthermore, there are concerns with regard to the setting 
up of private norms and their complex and ambiguous relations with legislation (Daugareilh 2005, 
and in this issue). 
 
Parallel to the development of codes of conduct, albeit starting at a later stage, so-called 
‘international or global framework agreements’ have been promoted, mainly by global union 
federations, to address an emerging need for the internationalisation of industrial and labour 
relations in the global context (Drouin 2005; Hammer 2005; Sobczak 2006a). First adopted in two 
                                                          
2 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (1976) were revised in 2000 after being fairly inactive. 
Improvements were made mainly to the content, including the inclusion of the core labour standards 
and supply chains. 
 
3 ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 1977. The Declaration of Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work 1997-98. 
 
4
 The UN initiated the Global Compact Initiative in 2000 in order to improve the cooperation of United Nations, the business community 
and other social groups towards sustainable economic development. The Global Compact is based on ten principles which reflect the 
General Human Rights Declaration, ILO core labour norms and the principles of ‘Agenda 21’ on sustainable development. 
 
French multinationals at the end of the 1980s and in the mid-1990s, and after a slow increase during 
the 1990s, the number of these agreements has accelerated since 2000. As of May 2007, 52 
agreements had been signed5. Although both codes of conducts and global framework agreements 
should be seen as instruments among a much larger range of firms’ initiatives at the international 
level, global framework agreements are concluded between international or European trade union 
organisations and the management of individual multinational companies and are thus, in most 
cases, based on a negotiation and bargaining process. Even if these international framework 
agreements (IFAs) are not legally binding and may not be considered as collective agreements 
(Sobczak 2006a), the assumption is that these agreements are more effective and legitimate than 
unilateral codes of conduct (Tørres and Gunnes 2003). Furthermore, they characterise new and 
additional paths to workers’ participation in multinationals’ governance. Beyond the formal content 
of these texts and their enforceability, the question is whether they are being used as a reference 
guide by the management and workers’ representatives and whether they have changed, at least 
partially, the strategies of both parties in the context of social conflicts or social dialogue. 
 
The research project on ‘Codes of conduct and international framework agreements: new 
developments in social regulation at company level’ aimed to analyse the impact of both codes of 
conduct and international framework agreements on labour conditions and on social dialogue, as 
well as on corporate cultures, and select good practice experience with regard to the issue of 
enforceability and effectiveness. In this respect, a twofold methodological approach was adopted. A 
quantitative analysis of all existing IFAs and of a sample of 50 codes of conduct has delivered an 
insight into the content of these texts, their scope, their dissemination and monitoring procedures 
and on the emerging provisions on dispute settlement in some of them. In parallel and adopting a 
qualitative approach, 11 case studies have been conducted in companies that have established a 
code of conduct, an IFA or both tools. Interviews with representatives from management and 
employees as well as with global union federations and employers associations enabled us to 
understand the motivations and interest constellations of these parties and to report on the concrete 
changes these tools have or have not introduced in the companies. This article presents the main 
findings of the research project and demonstrates in particular that international framework 
agreements characterize new paths to workers’ participation in multinationals’ governance. 
 
Table 1: Company case studies: titles of the documents 
 
Company Codes of conduct International framework agreement 
 
Arcelor Code of ethics Worldwide agreement on the Principles of 
ARCELOR’s Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
 
BASF Code of conduct. Compliance Programme 
of the Group 
 
--- 
 
Bosch --- Principles of Social Responsibility at Bosch 
 
Chiquita Code of conduct ‘Living by our own values’ IUF/COLSIBA and CHIQUITA 
Agreement on freedom of association, 
minimum labour standards and 
employment 
in Latin American Banana 
Operations 
 
EDF Group’s Principles of Ethical Practice Agreement on EDF Group Corporate 
Social Responsibility 
 
                                                          
5 65 international framework agreements had been registered as of December 2007. 
 
IKEA Minimum Requirements for Environment, 
Social and Working Conditions and Wood 
Merchandise 
IKEA Way of Purchasing Home Furnishing 
Products 
IKEA Way of Preventing Child Labour 
 
 
Framework agreement between IKEA and 
the IFBWW 
 
Leoni --- Declaration on Social Rights and Industrial 
Relationships at Leoni 
 
PSA Peugeot 
Citroën 
 
Code of ethics Global framework agreement on Social 
Responsibility 
 
Securitas Code of conduct Agreement on the Development of Good 
Working Relations in the Securitas Group 
 
Telefónica Our Business Principles UNI-Telefónica Code of Conduct 
 
Unilever Code of Business Principles --- 
 
 
 
Table 2: International framework agreements in our case studies 
 
Company Year Country Global union 
federation 
 
Signed by 
EWC 
 
Signed by 
national union 
 
Telefónica 2001 Spain UNI No Yes 
 
Chiquita 2001 USA IUF No No 
 
IKEA 2001 Sweden BWI No No 
 
Leoni 2002 Germany IMF Yes No 
 
Bosch 2004 Germany IMF Yes No 
 
EDF 2005 France ICEM, PSI, IFME 
and 
WFIW 
 
No Yes 
 
Arcelor 2005 Luxembourg IMF No No 
 
PSA Peugeot 
Citroën 
 
 
2006 France IMF No Yes 
 
Securitas 2006 Sweden UNI No Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CSR codes of conduct versus IFAs: from unilateral management initiatives to a 
participative joint commitment 
 
Almost all multinational companies have adopted a code of conduct in order to formalize their 
commitments in the field of CSR, whereby most of them refer to existing legislation (mainly in the 
United States). It seems that these texts are increasingly perceived as standard tools, not only for 
multinationals but also small and medium-sized companies, without relying on a detailed analysis of 
the added value they may create or even without paying too much attention to their impact. By 
contrast, international framework agreements constitute a more recent instrument that, as of 2007, 
only existed in some 52 companies whose managers usually scrutinise the challenges and advantages 
of negotiating such a text with the employees’ representatives. 
 
The analysis of the content, motivations and interests of the parties to IFAs shows that there are 
certain objective factors that may favour the negotiation of IFAs, such as the sector or the nationality 
of the company. International framework agreements are tools that are concentrated in five sectors 
(metal, construction, chemicals, food and services) and in companies headquartered in Member 
States of the European Union with a tradition of social dialogue, such as Germany and France. 
However, these factors are insufficient in explaining why a company negotiates an IFA. Indeed, there 
are numerous multinational companies in Germany and France in the five sectors that have no IFA, 
that do not plan to negotiate one in the near future and that are not even targeted by the relevant 
global union federations to negotiate such an agreement. It is therefore necessary to take a closer 
look at the more subjective motivations and interests of the parties involved. 
 
 
Context and motivation 
 
A global framework agreement or IFA is an agreement signed between the management of a 
multinational company and the relevant global union federation, which commits the company to 
respect minimum labour standards in its operations around the world. In most cases, it is based on a 
more or less long negotiation and bargaining process. First concluded in multinationals based in 
Europe (France, Germany and the Nordic countries – and indeed 80% of such companies are still 
headquartered in Europe), many other countries now also feature, such as the USA. 
 
Whereas codes of conduct are clearly a management initiative, IFAs are considered, at least by some 
companies, as embedded in the company’s international human resources policy and/or as part of 
the company’s social dialogue. However, only the representatives of the company’s headquarters 
sign the IFA, which reflects the reality of economic power within the company. As each subsidiary has 
its own legal personality, even if it is highly integrated in a group, the fact that only a representative 
of headquarters signs the IFA precludes it from being considered as a collective agreement as defined 
in labour law. 
 
On the workers’ side, global union federations are the main driving force for international framework 
agreements. The International Metalworkers’ Federation (IMF), the Building and Wood Workers’ 
International (BWI), the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, and Mining Workers (ICEM) 
and Union Network International are the most active unions in this respect, as they have recognised 
the need for developing mechanisms to negotiate with multinational corporations at global level 
over the last decades. International framework agreements are in some cases co-signed by national 
unions. This co-signing is discussed among the different actors involved; from a legal point of view, it 
seems to transform the international framework agreement into a collective bargaining agreement in 
the country where the headquarters are located (see below). 
 
The involvement of European Works Councils (EWCs) promoted by some international unions up to 
the co-signature of the agreement appears to be a strategy of the IMF only. Although not falling 
within the competence of EWCs according to the EU Directive 94/45/EC on the establishment of 
European Works Councils, this strategy seeks to guarantee EWCs’ future involvement in the 
dissemination and monitoring process. By including more partners on the side of the workers, unions 
secure the appropriation of the IFA by labour at all levels and in doing so combine competences and 
manpower. 
 
In most cases the initiative for negotiations lies with the global union federations, with the 
participation on a case-by-case basis of European and/or national unions, and of world, European 
and national works councils. In rare cases, IFAs are the result of a joint initiative of management and 
labour or even a management initiative. On the management side, the negotiations closely involve 
the human resources department, which relies on its experience in social dialogue. In this way 
human resources managers reaffirm their role in CSR issues. Other departments may however also 
be involved in negotiation rounds. 
 
Although objective factors of influence (either company specific such as structure, size and home 
country or international environment, sector, market, etc) may favour the adoption of codes of 
conduct and the negotiation of international framework agreements, they are insufficient to explain 
why a company adopts a code of conduct or negotiates an international framework agreement. 
 
A closer look at the more subjective motivations and interests of the parties shows that both 
management and workers negotiate international framework agreements in order to develop social 
dialogue at international level and to reinforce the corporate culture. They also aim at using IFAs to 
reduce social dumping and, by increasing adherence to core labour standards, to raise 
competitiveness in international markets and secure good and better workplaces. Another joint 
motivation is to develop social dialogue between management and labour at all levels in order to 
solve potential difficulties, and by doing so to create a kind of early warning system with regard to 
potential conflicts (see below). 
 
On the part of the trade unions, IFAs constitute a formal recognition of social partnership at the 
global level and provide a global framework for protecting trade union rights and encouraging social 
dialogue and collective bargaining. Furthermore, IFAs help to adapt good domestic social dialogue 
structures to the multinational level. An additional motivation is to strengthen the fight against 
violations of core labour standards both internally and externally, as well as to contribute to the 
harmonisation of good working conditions. Furthermore, IFAs help trade unions and workers to 
appropriate CSR issues and issues related to transnational social dialogue and they provide strong 
channels of communication with union members at all levels, not least to improve communication 
channels between them and management. 
 
For management, signing IFAs enables them to secure the competitiveness of the multinational in 
global markets and, especially, improves their position in the stock market with regard to ethical 
standards, thus influencing investors. Furthermore, IFAs contribute to a better risk management 
strategy by providing implementation measures (for a corporate code of conduct). They also create a 
coherent framework for the group’s commitment in the field of CSR to consumers and clients, as well 
as NGOs, and reinforce multinationals’ credibility. Finally, they also make it possible to share 
initiatives and to foster the group’s internal culture and values. 
 
Neither codes of conduct nor international framework agreements have a clear legal status. From a 
legal point of view, the adoption of these tools is voluntary, even if national legislations or public 
purchasing policies, as well as the pressure of stakeholders, may favour their adoption. The legally 
binding character of codes of conduct (Sobczak 2002) and international framework agreements is still 
an issue under discussion and is currently discussed within the framework of the growing debate on 
whether an optional legal framework in this field would encourage or halt the development of these 
tools (Ales et al. 2006). 
 
Content 
 
Both IFAs and codes of conduct may contribute to the definition of minimum standards, 
reaffirmation of core labour rights or more effective enforcement of labour laws among the different 
subsidiaries of the company, and among its suppliers. To contribute to improved industrial relations 
and working conditions, codes of conduct and IFAs can introduce new rights for workers, workers’ 
representatives and trade unions, or can emphasise making existing rights more effective. For 
workers in countries outside the European Union, the recognition of fundamental social rights may 
be a priority. Indirectly, this may also be of benefit to workers in the EU insofar as it contributes to 
the defining of minimum labour standards and thus to the fight against social dumping. But even 
within the EU, there is potential for progress, in particular in the development of rights that are not 
directly related to working conditions and that correspond to much broader social or environmental 
aspects of the lives of workers and their families. As we will show, the analysis of the content of IFAs 
and our sample of codes of conduct reveal that both instruments sometimes differ significantly with 
regard to the issues raised and the quality of the commitments.  
 
In contrast to many CSR codes of conduct, international framework agreements usually include 
commitments on trade union rights, collective bargaining rights, and information and consultation of 
the workforce. Whereas IFAs focus on issues related to labour rights and industrial relations and 
refer to the ILO, codes of conduct have a much broader scope, including also other CSR or business 
ethics issues. Both tools may include provisions on equal opportunities, health and safety, decent 
wages and the banning of child and forced labour. Another difference between IFAs and codes of 
conduct is related to the implementation and monitoring measures. IFAs allow unions to play a 
central part in participating in and monitoring the multinational’s core business. 
 
Another way for codes of conduct and IFAs to contribute to new rules in international industrial 
relations is to define a broad scope of application covering the company’s worldwide subsidiaries and 
suppliers. One of the major problems for working conditions and labour law standards in the era of 
globalisation is the fact that they are limited to the regulation of relations between companies and 
those who are bound to them through a contract of employment, thus excluding, in most cases, legal 
liability for the workers in subsidiaries and in subcontracting companies. Analysis of the content of 
international framework agreements and codes of conduct shows that many texts in both categories 
deal with the social regulation of the company’s suppliers. In general this is much more detailed in 
international framework agreements than in codes of conduct. This applies to both regulations and 
explicit references to subsidiaries, as well as to suppliers and business partners. But the surprisingly 
high rate of both IFAs and codes of conduct stipulating suppliers’ codes indicates a growing need for 
more effective social regulation in global supply chains, as well as the added value IFAs and codes 
might offer in this field. 
 
Looking at implementation measures for IFAs two basic approaches can be identified (similar to CSR 
agreements found at European and/or sectoral level). Either existing transnational structures or 
procedures such as EWCs are used (indeed EWCs seem to be playing an increasing role in this area), 
or a new supranational management-union forum or process is established. These two approaches 
can be combined or, alternatively, there can be simple consultation on compliance with workers’ 
representatives, with the appointment at management level of a person responsible for compliance 
control. If necessary, there can be recourse to an arbitration process. 
 
The analysis of the content of both codes of conduct and international framework agreements shows 
that IFAs can be considered as a means to promote the respect of fundamental social rights among 
multinational companies and their economic partners, whereas this is only partly the case for codes 
of conduct. Consequently, IFAs tend to correspond to an emerging form of social dialogue at the 
international level, whereas codes of conduct are mainly used as guidelines for behaviour and 
instruments of legal risk management for companies. The analysis of the content of the existing IFAs 
and the sample of codes of conduct highlight that IFAs aim at regulating labour relations within 
multinational companies, even if they may sometimes include broader issues, whereas codes of 
conduct aim at reaffirming norms related to the broader concept of corporate social responsibility 
and business ethics, and thus also include references to labour standards. In the case of IFAs, labour 
standards are the main focus, whereas in codes of conduct labour standards are only one issue 
among others. 
 
Impact: the involvement of workers makes the difference 
 
International framework agreements and codes of conduct differ to an important extent in their 
dissemination and monitoring procedures. Whereas the dissemination and monitoring of IFAs involve 
both social partners and thus contribute to creating new issues for social dialogue, the 
implementation of codes of conduct usually remains in the sole hands of the management, control 
sometimes being entrusted to external auditors. This finding is confirmed by the fact that some 
companies have decided to conclude an IFA to improve the dissemination and monitoring of their 
existing code of conduct. 
 
International framework agreements and codes of conduct also differ as to the duties they impose 
on employees. Many codes of conduct explicitly provide for disciplinary or even civil sanctions for 
employees whose behaviour does not conform to the principles they lay down (see Daugareilh, in 
this issue). In many cases, the employees are also required to report any violations of the code they 
may observe using anonymous hotlines.nternational framework agreements contain no such 
provisions. On the contrary, the latter sometimes create dispute settlement procedures involving the 
social partners at the local, national and international levels. They thus underline the signatory 
parties’ willingness to use IFAs to identify possible violations of fundamental social rights in 
subsidiaries or even suppliers at an early stage and to solve these problems internally through social 
dialogue rather than go to court or bring the matter to the attention of the general public. 
 
Furthermore, the involvement of both management and unions in the dissemination and monitoring 
of IFAs makes it more likely that the enforcement of fundamental labour rights will have a real 
impact, since it is based not only on one tool and one key actor, but on several instruments and the 
involvement of both social partners. Although both corporate codes and IFAs have a positive impact 
on the implementation of basic labour and social rights, certain fundamental rights such as freedom 
of association and collective bargaining, in contrast to other fundamental labour rights, are covered 
by corporate codes to a much lesser degree. 
 
Furthermore, domestic workers’ consultation bodies such as (European) works councils and/or 
national unions may play an important role in the elaboration and/or implementation of 
international framework agreements. Works councils, as well as EWCs, are legally established bodies 
enabling the exchange of information between management and workforce. As such, they are an 
institutional platform with resources and access to information on the national and European 
activities of firms. In addition, they also have consultation rights and are part of the social dialogue 
structure at business level. It is therefore obvious that they may play a role in the development of 
IFAs, although not all EWCs play an important role 6. It is clear that the activities of EWCs have 
                                                          
6 The involvement of EWCs is characterised by a certain heterogeneity from one multinational to another. Differences in the practices and 
effective roles of the EWCs may be influenced by a common set of factors (Marginson et al. 2004): the degree of internationalisation of 
production in the multinational and the need to create a business alignment in the subsidiaries which allows the EWCs to intervene; capacity 
influenced international framework agreements in recent years. This can be seen in sectors in which 
European federations – such as the European Metalworkers’ Federation – are particularly engaged in 
supporting EWC involvement as a facilitator in the negotiation of international framework 
agreements (Bourque 2005; Pulignano 2005). A general trend seems to be that the unions are 
increasingly recognizing the usefulness of the EWCs as a source of information and, at times, as a 
forum for coordination to the extent that EWCs are invited to sign agreements (Teljohann 2005). This 
may lead to trade unions cooperating more effectively with EWCs in order to promote European-
level negotiation but also in the context of international framework agreements. As a consequence, 
some unions have started to invest more in EWCs. In this respect, EWCs are contributing to the 
Europeanisation of industrial relations systems based on the transnational dimension of the 
workforce (Daugareilh 2005; Moreau 2006; Voss 2006). Interestingly, and according to the 
circumstances, the existence of a well-functioning European Works Council may have a certain 
influence on the willingness of the management to negotiate an IFA (Moreau 2006). Furthermore, 
EWCs may serve as the precursor of a wider, broader information and consultation body that the 
partners of international framework agreements may set up to ensure the reporting and monitoring 
of their agreements. In some cases, the EWC fulfils this task beyond its European scope of 
application, but in other cases the use of EWCs can be a strong limitation (Liv and Stein 2003). 
 
Finally, clear differences between international framework agreements and codes of conduct result 
from their different natures: international framework agreements represent a pragmatic approach to 
industrial relations and social dialogue, which also includes the acceleration of the elaboration of 
global structures of dialogue, information and consultation and the ‘export’ of a certain domestic or 
European social model of employer-employee relations. In contrast, corporate codes of conduct 
represent an affirmative approach that seeks to reinforce good corporate practice and both illustrate 
and implement the excellence of the respective company in fields such as management integrity and 
compliance with basic human rights and national laws, including basic labour rights. Concrete 
impacts are much harder to discern in this respect. 
 
Based on these developments, our hypothesis is that the switch from CSR policies as simple PR 
instruments to company-specific strategies, including trade union involvement and negotiation of 
international framework agreements, is the result of a growing motivation on the part of both 
multinationals and unions to close the current legal gap in international and European labour law in 
order to (self-) regulate the social consequences 
of globalisation, and ensure adherence to labour and social standards, though for different reasons. 
 
Opportunities and limits of IFAs in paving the way to the internationalisation 
of industrial relations 
 
However, the increasing number of negotiation procedures and signatures of international 
framework agreements should be put in perspective. So far only a small number of multinationals 
(65 in December 2007) are involved, mostly based in the European Union. The scope for further 
agreements remains for the moment rather limited, given that, on the one hand, global unions 
acknowledge the need for an evaluation of the process in respect of impact assessment and 
indicators of good practices, while on the other hand managements rarely initiate negotiations on 
international framework agreements. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
to appropriate the issues of globalisation and CSR; the management strategy; the structure and acceptance of the workers’ representative 
body (Teljohann 2005); capital structure (Müller and Platzer 2003); and the functioning of the body itself. 
 
 
Nevertheless, international framework agreements can be seen as stepping stones in a process of 
creating social dialogue between multinational managements and the workforce for dealing with the 
social consequences of globalisation. The message to public policy given out by these initiatives of 
private actors via sui generis agreements is clear: it is their intention to overcome the current legal 
gaps in the regulation of international labour issues through self-regulation. However, private actors 
cannot take over the role of public authorities. 
 
Workers’ involvement as a benchmark for strengthening international social 
dialogue between labour and management of multinationals 
 
The above discussion shows clearly that international framework agreements point towards new 
opportunities and space for trade union organisation and bargaining, as they pursue the same goals 
of promoting social dialogue with multinationals. 
 
In most cases, IFAs have been negotiated on the basis of existing good relations between the 
multinational’s headquarters and the workforce, represented by global, local and/or national unions 
and/or (European) works councils. Here again, the existence of a well-functioning industrial relations 
system applied at company level plays a decisive role in the promotion of such good social relations 
within a broader, international arena. Furthermore, international framework agreements are not 
intended to substitute for local and national collective agreements, but rather to function as a 
supplementary and additional level of dialogue to local practice. Moreover, IFAs need the local level 
to secure the efficient appropriation and implementation of the issues. 
 
In addition, international framework agreements represent a new means by which unions at all levels 
are able to raise awareness and promote union rights and additional core labour standards and to 
make them applicable within the scope of multinationals’ activities, thus ‘adapting’ domestic (legally) 
binding rights outside their national scope of application. 
 
On the one hand, companies recognise the positive impact of international framework agreements 
on corporate culture, industrial relations and the corporate image, to the extent that in a few cases 
employers have initiated negotiations, thereby acknowledging the ‘win-win’ character of IFAs. On the 
other hand, international framework agreements tend to transform firms’ CSR policies into more 
concrete and binding commitments, thus enriching both the transparency of their principles and 
objectives and their internal and external credibility. In doing so, international framework 
agreements give unions the possibility to monitor corporate behaviour on an agreed basis and to act 
upon any violation of workers’ rights by entering into direct consultation and negotiations with the 
company management. Thus international framework agreements seem to have an increasing 
function as early warning systems and are starting to operate as alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms by creating a framework for mediation and consultation. A last resort in the case of 
violation of international framework agreements would be for unions to campaign publicly against 
the multinationals, as the relevant legal procedure is still uncertain, at least on the basis of labour 
regulations. On the basis of consumer law and competition law, however, consumers and rival 
enterprises can make claims against, respectively, unfair and misleading advertising and failures to 
respect good faith and morals in competition. Both stakeholder groups can exert considerable public 
pressure on a company that uses the fact that it observes certain social minimum standards as a form 
of manipulative advertising for its products. However, a code of conduct or an international 
framework agreement will not be brought before the courts on the basis of the violation of a 
fundamental social right, but on the ground of violation of a company’s obligation to inform 
consumers fairly. 
 
In this way, IFAs seem to be a way of promoting a culture of legal compliance and respect for core 
labour standards, as well as good industrial relations and respect for the role of trade unions 
alongside processes of globalisation (Liv and Stein 2003; Justice 2004). However, they also open up 
new challenges and a need for clarification. 
 
Limits of self-regulation 
 
The challenge clearly is to prevent CSR and codes of conduct from becoming a substitute for proper 
regulation (Justice 2004). Because international framework agreements are a voluntary form of social 
regulation created by the social partners without a legal framework, they leave open many 
questions. The main areas of clarification concerned are (i) the legal nature and impact of these texts, 
(ii) the representativeness and mandates of the signatory parties, from multinational managements 
to (global, regional or local) unions, including EWCs, (iii) the scope of application of international 
framework agreements as concerns groups of enterprises and coverage of workers in subsidiaries 
and suppliers, (iv) the legitimacy of the actors involved in dealing with other issues, such as core 
labour standards, AIDS or the environment, and (v) finally their legal status (Sobczak 2006b). The lack 
of legal certainty may lead unions to be careful in negotiating and signing international framework 
agreements. On the other hand, multinationals are unable properly to evaluate the risks they may 
face in signing international framework agreements – for example, the legal risk of court 
proceedings. 
 
Embedded in the debates on the development of soft law and the trend towards labour law 
deregulation (Schömann 2004), CSR in general and international framework agreements cannot 
ensure that social and economic stability, together with the protection of core labour standards, are 
maintained and protected by soft law alone. Many scholars have stressed the need for action by the 
public authorities to frame CSR initiatives in order to ensure their transparency and credibility, but 
also to bring some organisation to the anarchic and spontaneous development of CSR initiatives. 
Moreover, state and public authorities are already involved in CSR initiatives in some EU Member 
States as regulatory bodies and/or as initiators7. Although little research has been done on this issue, 
an interesting study (Bredgaard 2004) on the necessary links between public policy programmes and 
business interests has demonstrated the need to develop policy instruments in order to transcend 
the dichotomy between voluntarism and coercion in CSR approaches. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
CSR can be a contradictory notion. It is important to identify both the stakeholders and their 
motivations for joining and appropriating CSR initiatives. While unions seek to agree international 
framework agreements, thus encouraging businesses to take the ‘high road’ in respect of their 
competitive behaviour, they also seek a public commitment as a countervailing power in the form of 
regulations. Some multinationals, on the other hand, although asserting the voluntary nature of CSR, 
commit themselves to more binding obligations in signing up to international framework 
agreements. Thus the appropriation by both parties of CSR as a potential added value for business 
and its accountability acknowledges the close link between corporate social responsibility and 
transnational social dialogue. In this way, both management and labour show their desire to address 
the limitations of both (domestic) labour legislation and industrial relations at international level in 
                                                          
7 Practical examples of public involvement can be found in French legislation on new economic regulation, which includes the obligation 
for listed companies to publish an overview of the social and environmental impact of their activities, and in the Belgian law on social 
labelling. Furthermore, by encouraging the introduction of social clauses in procurement contracts, public authorities have shown their 
commitment to participate in CSR initiatives in order to ensure that certain social standards are applied in the awarding of public contracts, 
as long as these standards do not discriminate against other and/or foreign tenders. The ECJ has recognised the compatibility of this 
approach under EC rules on public procurement (ECJ, 20 September 1988: Case C-31/87 and ECJ, 2000: Case C-225/98). 
 
providing the necessary conditions for dealing with the social consequences of a global economy. By 
acting as self-regulators, they suggest a negotiated way of filling the current legal gaps in 
international and European labour law in order to secure adherence to labour and social standards. 
They thereby also influence the growing political debate on the elaboration and efficiency of 
international working and production standards by private actors. Investigation of the context of this 
process, the motivations of the parties, the content of the agreements and their implementation 
measures provides valuable insights into the impact on multinationals’ behaviour of international 
framework agreements in respect of social dialogue and core labour standards. The influence of 
private actors on public policy-making via sui generis agreements is clear but reaches the limits of 
private self-regulation at European and international level. Here again, as in the case of the 
development of the European Works Council Directive, practice seems to precede legislation, 
addressing at the same time the need for supranational structures and the regulation of labour 
standards and industrial relations at transnational level. 
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